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I. INTRODUCTION 
Society instinctively censors the unfamiliar. Time and time again, 
new media—from books to music to interactive technology—spark 
debates regarding children’s vulnerability to increasingly effective 
vehicles for damaging subject matter, resulting in the passage of laws 
that regulate the distribution and sale of ostensibly dangerous 
materials.1 Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association2 is 
yet another case arising from concerns about the impact of new forms 
of media and the messages they carry. As for inflammatory true-crime 
novels, comic books, and movies, now video games with violent 
content are perceived as a threat to a child’s healthy development, 
and therefore requiring government regulation.3 The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Entertainment Merchants Association likely will help to 
resolve the issue of whether the government should involve itself in 
the regulation of such media—particularly with regard to depictions 
of violence in video games. 
The increasing popularity of video games, and apparent 
accessibility of violent games, directed legislative attention to the 
 
 2012 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Brief of the Progress & Freedom Found. and the Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents at 25–26, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, No. 08-1448 
(U.S. Sept. 17, 2010). 
 2. Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, No. 08-1448 (U.S. argued Nov. 2, 2010). 
 3. Brief of Respondents at 1, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, No. 08-1448 (U.S. 
Sept. 10, 2010). 
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question of whether their violent content is a form of protectable 
speech, subject to strict scrutiny upon judicial review. The State of 
California argues that video games should not be subject to strict 
scrutiny review because such a standard does not take into account 
the overarching need to restrict minors’ access to offensive materials 
and preserve the State’s ability to empower parents to protect 
“minors in the face of new and developing media.”4 The Supreme 
Court, which has been criticized for straying from the doctrine of 
stare decisis of late,5 must be guided by the weight of First 
Amendment jurisprudence on expressive entertainment and allegedly 
harmful and unprotected forms of speech. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 17, 2005, associations of video game developers, 
publishers, distributors, and retail and rental companies (collectively, 
EMA) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California for declaratory relief6 against a newly-enacted 
state law.7 The California statute imposed restrictions on the sale or 
rental of “violent video games” to minors and required warning labels 
on packaging for mature video games.8 EMA brought the action 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, arguing that the statute 
was unconstitutional as a content-based restriction of expression and 
was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.9 The district court ultimately granted EMA’s motion for 
summary judgment, permanently enjoining any enforcement of the 
statute.10 The statute did not survive strict scrutiny review, and the 
court left the equal protection claims unaddressed.11 
 
 
 
 4. Petitioners’ Brief at 28–29, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, No. 08-1448 (U.S. 
July 12, 2010). 
 5. Steven R. Shapiro, ACLU Legal Director, Tradeoffs of Candor: Does Judicial 
Transparency Erode Legitimacy?, Remarks at Symposium Held at the N.Y.U. Sch. of Law 
(Mar. 11, 2008), in N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L., 2009, at 469–70 (discussing the Roberts Court’s 
decisions that were inconsistent with preexisting rulings). 
 6. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted sub nom. Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010). 
 7. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2010). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 955. 
 10. Id. at 955–56. 
 11. Id. at 956. 
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 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision.12 The Ninth Circuit held that: (1) the 
statute was indeed subject to strict scrutiny, rather than to the 
Ginsberg variable obscenity standard,13 (2) the statute failed under 
strict scrutiny because the State did not demonstrate a compelling 
interest and did not tailor the law to be the least-restrictive means for 
furthering the alleged interest, and (3) the labeling requirement 
constituted “impermissibly compelled speech.”14 
There is a consensus among district and circuit courts in favor of 
striking down such laws abridging minors’ expression rights under 
strict scrutiny.15 In light of this unanimity and other landmark speech 
cases,16 the Supreme Court will rule on (1) whether states may restrict 
the distribution and sale of video games with violent content to 
minors and (2) whether the standard of review for such a state 
regulation is strict scrutiny.17 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law  
. . . abridging the freedom of speech.”18 The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates this protection to apply to the 
States.19 Although State legislatures have passed measures restricting 
expressive entertainment in print and other media, the Court has 
recognized this category of speech as entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.20 Government may not bar speech based on objectionable 
 
 12. Id. at 953. 
 13. See infra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
 14. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 967. 
 15. See Brief in Opposition at 12, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, No. 08-1448 
(U.S. July 22, 2009) (“California was not the first state to try to restrict distribution of video 
games it considered too violent for minors. Such laws have proved politically popular, but every 
one has been struck down under the First Amendment.”). 
 16. See infra notes 19–25, 67, 68 and accompanying text. 
 17. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at i. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 19. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[F]reedom of speech and of the 
press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among 
the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (holding that magazines 
containing crime stories are entitled to First Amendment protection); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) (holding that motion pictures fall within the “First 
Amendment’s aegis”). 
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content, except with respect to a few specific categories.21 These 
narrow categories traditionally include “obscenity,” “defamation,” 
“fraud,” “incitement,” “and speech integral to criminal conduct . . . .”22 
Furthermore, the Court has taken both content and context into 
account when reviewing the regulation of offensive speech that has 
the potential to harm children.23 For the most part, First Amendment 
protections apply consistently to all individuals regardless of age,24 but 
the Court recognizes several differences between adults’ and 
children’s ability to process speech, such that the rights of minors may 
be curtailed according to their vulnerabilities.25 
The Supreme Court acknowledged the need to protect children 
from harmful speech in Ginsberg v. New York.26 In Ginsberg, the 
Court upheld a state statute that restricted the sale of “girlie 
magazines” to minors, for whom the state legislature found such 
material to be obscene and harmful.27 The law at issue defined the 
phrase “harmful to minors” to describe representations containing 
“nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse” 
that “(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid 
interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards 
in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable 
material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social 
importance for minors.”28 Although the materials at issue in Ginsberg 
may not have been considered obscene and harmful to adults, the 
Court recognized the need for a variable obscenity standard that 
accounted for the vulnerability of minors.29 In order to uphold the 
statute at issue, the Court held that it only needed to determine “it 
was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material 
condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.”30 The Court carefully 
limited the scope of the decision to the regulation of sex materials and 
 
 21. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (“[O]ur society . . . has permitted 
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas . . . .”). 
 22. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 23. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (justifying “special treatment of 
indecent broadcasting” that is accessible to children). 
 24. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1975). 
 25. Id. at 214 n.11 (“The First Amendment rights of minors are not ‘co-extensive with 
those of adults.’” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J., 
concurring))). 
 26. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 27. Id. at 643. 
 28. Id. at 646 (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. at 641. 
 30. Id. 
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declined to extend the lenient standard to any other areas of 
expression, such as violence, by reaffirming that obscenity covers only 
sexual subject matter.31 
United States v. Stevens32 expanded the protection afforded to 
violent speech. The Court grappled with a federal statute 
criminalizing the production, sale, and possession of “certain 
depictions of animal cruelty” that show “maimed, mutilated, tortured, 
wounded, or killed” animals.33 The Court not only determined that the 
criteria listed in the statute were so broad as to prohibit even lawful 
conduct, but, more significantly, it also declined to create a new carve-
out for portrayals of animal cruelty.34 The Court asserted that the 
government is not permitted “to imprison any speaker so long as his 
speech is deemed valueless or unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc 
calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a statute’s favor.”35 Freedom of 
speech is a transcendent value, and “the benefits of [First 
Amendment] restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”36 
Because the Court refused to recognize a new exception to First 
Amendment protection, the Court reviewed the statute under 
“existing doctrine”37 and found it unconstitutional. 
In Entertainment Merchants Association, the California statute at 
issue (the Act) regulates the sale or rental of “violent video games” to 
minors, requires content-rating labels on game packaging, and 
imposes civil penalties for inappropriate sales.38 As defined by the Act, 
a “violent video game” involves “killing, maiming, dismembering, or 
sexually assaulting an image of a human being . . . .”39 Also, the 
depictions in the game must be such that: “(i) [a] reasonable person, 
considering the game as a whole, would find  [they] appeal[] to a 
deviant or morbid interest of minors”; “(ii) [they are] patently 
offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is 
suitable for minors”; and “(iii) [they] cause[] the game, as a whole, to 
 
 31. See id. at 636–37 (“We have no occasion in this case to consider the impact of the 
guarantees of freedom of expression upon the totality of the relationship of the minor and the 
State . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 32. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
 33. Id. at 1582 (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. at 1586. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1585. 
 37. Id. at 1586. 
 38. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2010). 
 39. Id. at § 1746(d)(1). 
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lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.”40 
These criteria mirror those in the controversial obscenity statute in 
Ginsberg. The Act’s preamble states that the legislature was 
responding to the concern that exposure to violent video games is 
likely to lead to heightened aggression in minors.41 The State asserted 
that it had a “compelling interest in preventing violent, aggressive, and 
antisocial behavior, and in preventing psychological or neurological 
harm to minors . . .” because even those who do not commit violent 
acts are expected to suffer psychological harm from exposure to 
violent video games. 42 
IV. HOLDING 
On appeal, the State asked the Ninth Circuit to “boldly go where 
no court has gone before” and apply Ginsberg’s variable obscenity 
standard to the context of violent expression.43 The Ninth Circuit 
refused to read Ginsberg beyond the traditional scope of restrictions 
on sexually-offensive speech.44 Instead, it maintained the Supreme 
Court’s application of the variable obscenity standard to sexual 
expression alone and did not extend the standard to violent 
expression.45 The Ninth Circuit, like other circuit courts, was not 
convinced of the arguable similarity between the two forms of 
expression.46 
The Ninth Circuit further held that strict scrutiny was the 
applicable standard of review, as violent video games are a protected 
form of speech.47 The panel assessed the State’s interest in protecting 
the physical and psychological well being of minors, particularly 
focusing on actual physiological harms to children playing violent 
video games.48 Finding the social science studies on which the State 
relied fraught with methodological problems and, at best, only 
demonstrating statistically weak links, the court concluded that the 
 
 40. Id. at § 1746(d)(1)(A). 
 41. A.B. 1179, ch. 638, § 1 (Cal. 2005). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted sub nom. Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010). 
 44. Id. at 967. 
 45. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968) (relying on the definition of 
obscenity in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486–87 (1957)). 
 46. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 960 (summarizing circuit courts’ 
unwillingness to broaden the definition of obscenity to cover violent content). 
 47. Id. at 957–58. 
 48. Id. at 961. 
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State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a causal link between 
exposure to video-game violence and psychological or neurological 
harm.49 Even if the State carried its first burden of showing a 
compelling interest, the Ninth Circuit held that it still would strike 
down the statute because the State did not show that less-restrictive 
alternatives were unavailable.50 The court suggested that a 
combination of existing measures, such as the Entertainment 
Software Rating Board (ESRB) rating system, parental controls on 
gaming platforms, and education campaigns for retailers and parents, 
could be as-effective yet less-restrictive means to achieve the State’s 
goals. Because the State insisted on enforcement mechanisms that 
were the most effective measures possible, as opposed to 
appropriately tailored, the court held that the Act failed under strict 
scrutiny review.51 
V. ARGUMENTS 
The debate before the Supreme Court revolves around the 
question of whether depictions of violence in video games are 
protected forms of expression, and, if so, whether restricting the sale 
of such games violates the First Amendment.52 
A. California’s (Petitioner’s) Arguments 
The State’s primary concern is parents’ ability to make choices 
and exercise authority in their children’s upbringing.53 Society has a 
well-established interest in protecting children and assisting parents in 
directing their children’s development.54 By restricting the latter’s 
unsupervised access to violent video games, parents can maintain 
control in childrearing.55 Where minors lack the moral and social 
capacity to participate constructively and reasonably in the 
marketplace of ideas, parents are entitled to support from the State to 
guide their children’s choices.56 The State argues that it is incorrect to 
limit the application of Ginsberg to the realm of sexual expression, 
 
 49. Id. at 964. 
 50. Id. at 964–65. 
 51. Id. at 965. 
 52. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at 6–12. 
 53. Id. at 12–13. 
 54. Id. at 13. 
 55. Id. at 12–13. 
 56. See id. at 14–15 (arguing that minors’ mental faculties are not on par with that of adults, 
and that parents have the right to participate in the choices their children make). 
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and insists that excessively violent material be recognized as a 
“categor[y] of speech that [has] been historically unprotected, but 
[has] not yet been identified or discussed as such in our case law.”57 
Ginsberg’s variable obscenity standard ought to be extended to 
uphold restrictions on minors’ access to violent speech, particularly in 
video games.58 
The State argues that Ginsberg is about the potentially harmful 
nature of speech in general, rather than solely addressing sexual 
content. Thus, Ginsberg is ripe for extension to other types of 
allegedly harmful content in other forms of media.59 Where there is 
both a constitutional parental right to claim authority over 
childrearing and an independent state interest in the well being of 
minors, the State argues that its protective measures should be subject 
to Ginsberg’s variable obscenity standard.60 The State construes other 
speech cases involving minors to emphasize the importance of 
parents’ constitutional role in protecting children against potential 
harms over the significance of the Court’s historically narrow 
definition of the word “obscene.”61 
While leading the Court to revisit a number of landmark cases 
that justify different treatment of adults and minors, the State 
bifurcates the constitutional protection of speech for two separate 
audiences.62 Legal restrictions on children’s access to violent video 
games will support parents’ aims in enabling their children to fully 
grow and mature.63 The State says that the age-based differences 
“compel states to apply differing legal standards,” and to 
accommodate minors’ rash decision making and susceptibility to 
certain media.64 
The vulnerability of children calls for the recognition of an 
existing but as-yet unidentified carve-out for violent speech, which is 
similar to other forms of unprotected speech and to which the 
 
 57. Id. at 13 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010)). 
 58. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at 28. 
 59. See id. at 16–17. 
 60. Id. at 18. 
 61. See id. at 18–22 (discussing offensive broadcast and school speech precedents and 
suggesting that the rulings for those cases rest on the need to protect children from potential 
harm, whatever it may be, and on school officials’ authority to act in loco parentis). 
 62. Id. at 23–24. 
 63. Id. at 25. 
 64. See id. at 25–26 (emphasis added) (noting minors’ susceptibility to “the harmful effects 
of external influences”). 
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Ginsberg standard should apply.65 The State contends that the 
constitutionality of a statute that regulates minors’ exposure to 
“offensive material that appeals to their deviant interest . . . should 
not turn on empirical evidence, but on society’s recognition of the 
importance of the parental role.”66 The State construes Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission67 
and Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc.68 to support a relaxed approach to empirical studies of finding 
harm.69 Legislators appear to have some leeway to predict future 
events and their likely impacts,70 and they may determine whether 
exposure to indecent speech in video games harms children even 
when gathering data is not methodologically reasonable.71 The State 
finds the First Amendment’s broad protections incongruent with 
requiring empirical proof of impacts on morality and ethics, as they 
are subjects that are not easily defined.72 It should be sufficient to rely 
on a legislature’s rational determination of what types of expression 
will likely harm minors.73 Under a lower level of scrutiny, like that 
provided in Ginsberg, establishing a correlative relationship would be 
sufficient to uphold the Act.74 
The State analyzes sexually-explicit materials that have been 
labeled “obscene” and finds they would not have been categorized as 
such but for the violence that permeated their content.75 Empirical 
bases aside, the State infers that because the presence of violence is 
often what makes protected speech no longer protectable, violent 
 
 
 
 65. Id. at 28. 
 66. Id. at 28–29. 
 67. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (predicting that 
local broadcasting would be jeopardized without mandatory carriage rules, and holding that 
content-neutral must-carry provisions are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny). 
 68. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) 
(accepting scant empirical evidence of the harmful effects of exposing children to broadcast 
profanity, and finding the FCC’s orders banning the broadcasting of any indecent language 
neither arbitrary nor capricious). 
 69. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at 48–50. 
 70. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 665–66. 
 71. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1813. 
 72. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at 30. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 56. 
 75. Id. at 37. 
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content standing alone should also fall into the category of 
unprotected expression with respect to access by minors.76 
Finally, the State argues the Act protects minors by using the least 
restrictive means necessary, rather than the most restrictive means as 
the Ninth Circuit held.77 The Act is narrowly tailored because it is 
triggered only in instances of sales or rentals to minors who are not 
accompanied by their parents.78 The existing ESRB and technological 
restrictions to access have not prevented sales of excessively violent 
games to minors without parental consent, and, without the full 
voluntary cooperation of game publishers and sellers, the State must 
step in to restrict children’s access to potentially harmful products.79 
B. EMA’s (Respondents’) Arguments 
Because depictions of violence are protected forms of expression 
under the First Amendment and because there is tenuous support for 
the claim of harm to minors, the Act is subject to and fails strict 
scrutiny.80 EMA points to United States v. Stevens, in which the Court 
recently reaffirmed that the historically recognized carve-outs are 
limited to their traditionally understood definitions and boundaries.81 
While the Court’s holding in Stevens acknowledged the possible 
existence of speech categories that have yet to be identified by the 
courts, there is no evidence that violent expression is among them.82 
An overwhelming volume of precedent establishes that obscenity is 
limited to sexual expression.83 
The tradition of regulating depictions of sex stands in stark 
contrast to the lack of history of regulated violent expression.84 While 
sexual expression involving violent acts is unprotected, it does not 
stand to reason that violence alone is also obscene and unprotected, 
and therefore ought to be equated with obscenity.85 In fact, “violence, 
 
 76. Id. at 38. 
 77. Id. at 38–39. 
 78. Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 19–20, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, No. 08-
1448 (U.S. Oct. 8, 2010). 
 79. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at 57–58. 
 80. Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 19, 47. 
 81. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584–86 (2010). 
 82. Id. 
 83. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 
(1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1957). 
 84. Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 21. 
 85. Id. 
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unlike explicit descriptions of sex, is a central feature of expression 
intended for minors” as evidenced by the pervasive depictions of 
violence in children’s literature and films.86 To find non-sexual 
materials unworthy of constitutional protection for their offensive 
content potentially validates regulations that censor expression in all 
manner of media—a trend that “is startling and dangerous.”87 
EMA narrowly construes Ginsberg as addressing obscenity only 
as it is traditionally defined.88 Ginsberg did not allow the government 
to regulate protected forms of expression or to create new carve-outs 
with regard to minors.89 EMA paints the picture of a slippery slope in 
which the exercise of “freewheeling authority”90 to create exceptions 
to First Amendment protections sends “the censor . . . adrift upon a 
boundless sea . . . with no charts.”91 
While the State insists the Act is necessary for parents to exercise 
their constitutional right to raise their children by controlling their 
access to certain media, the government must not determine “in the 
first instance which expression is ‘worthy’ of protection.”92 The 
government may claim to help parents, but it actually assumes the 
role of the parents entirely by prescribing appropriate or excessive 
levels of violent content.93 “[O]pinions and judgments, including 
esthetic and moral judgments . . . are . . . not for the Government to 
decree,” and the Court should recognize that the Act is presumptively 
invalid like any other content-based restriction.94 
Furthermore, EMA argues that the State cannot claim a 
compelling interest where the purported “significant societal 
problem” is not proven to exist.95 EMA does not accept the State’s 
relaxed standard for empirical findings, but puts far more stock in 
solid empirical evidence to prove harm to minors.96 The research 
presented in support of the Act “has been resoundingly rejected by 
 
 86. Id. at 31–32. 
 87. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. 
 88. Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 30. 
 89. Id. at 31. 
 90. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010). 
 91. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504–05 (1952). 
 92. Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 28. 
 93. See id. at 30 (“[Government] usurps [the parents’] role and favors the preferences of 
some parents over those of others.”). 
 94. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). 
 95. Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 35. 
 96. Id. at 36. 
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every court to have looked at it.”97 Social science research on video 
games has been challenged and largely discredited as it shows no 
more than a weak correlation between the degree of exposure to 
violent video games and aggression, and “‘it is impossible to know 
which way the causal relationship runs.’”98 On the other hand, there is 
reliable statistical evidence of game-consuming behaviors among 
children and their parents strongly suggesting that parents have every 
opportunity to supervise the purchasing and playing of video games in 
their households.99 
Finally, by applying strict scrutiny to the presumptively invalid 
statute, EMA argues that the State has not only failed to articulate a 
compelling state interest but also failed narrowly tailored the Act to 
serve the purported interest.100 EMA reiterates that the Act is not the 
least restrictive means of achieving the State’s aims and points to the 
industry’s highly effective self-regulation and parental involvement as 
sufficient to police children’s consumption of video games.101 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
In Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the 
Supreme Court is unlikely to stray from the well-beaten path of 
protecting violent speech under the First Amendment. Rather, the 
Court likely will hold that the Ginsberg standard should be applied 
only in the context of sexual expression. Although the Ginsberg Court 
conceded that there might be other areas in which the standards for 
speech regulation will vary for adult and minor audiences, this case is 
unlikely to create a new variable standard with regard to violent 
content.102 The arguments for cabining the application of the Ginsberg 
standard are persuasive because obscenity has never covered content 
beyond that of a sexual nature. Indeed, violence has long been a 
feature of children’s entertainment whereas sexual content has not.103 
Although individuals may find both obscenity and violence offensive 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 38–40 (quoting Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1074 
(N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 99. Id. at 37. 
 100. Id. at 47. 
 101. Id. at 53–54. 
 102. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (“We have no occasion in this case to 
consider the impact of the guarantees of freedom of expression upon the totality of the 
relationship of the minor and the State.”). 
 103. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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or immoral, these similar reactions are insufficient to subject obscene 
and violent content to the same standard of review.  
It is significant that this case closely follows United States v. 
Stevens.104 There, the Court refused to add a carve-out for depictions 
of violence against animals as the category was not “of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit may be derived from 
[it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”105 Stevens serves as a stepping-stone to establishing a 
general principle that restrictions on any depiction of violence, in any 
medium, will be subject to strict scrutiny. 
Because the State asks the Court to go where no court has gone 
before, its argument is largely policy-driven. During oral arguments, 
the State’s counsel cited two reasons for regulating minors’ access to 
violent video games: to bolster parents’ authority over their children’s 
upbringing and to help parents protect their children when 
unsupervised.106 The State claims that the Act is intended to place 
authority back in the hands of parents excluded from their children’s 
choices of media and entertainment.107 This, however, is only an issue 
if violent video games actually harm children. The Act’s preamble 
declares that the State has an interest in preventing harm to minors 
due to exposure to violence depicted in video games.108 What the 
Court should address is whether the purported dangers posed to 
minors actually exist and, if so, what protective measures are 
appropriate. 
Where children are described as vulnerable, and parents’ rights to 
childrearing are made an issue, it is tempting to downplay the need 
for concrete evidence of harm. However, without causal evidence of 
the new media actually harming children, the Court likely will not 
recognize the Act as furthering a compelling state interest. 
Furthermore, without a clear showing of the deficiencies of all 
alternative measures to protect minors from the purported harm, the 
 
 104. Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Violent Video Games, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 26, 2010, 
10:05 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=19152 (“The Court apparently had been holding the 
case until it decided another First Amendment case involving violent expression—U.S. v. 
Stevens (08-769).”). 
 105. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992)). 
 106. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–4, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n., No. 08-
1448 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2010). 
 107. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at 12–18. 
 108. A.B. 1179, ch. 638, § 1 (Cal. 2005). 
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Act does not meet the narrow-tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny. 
Although the State argues that the Act will impact only the sale and 
rental of games deemed harmful to minors, and will only target 
minors who attempt to access violent video game content while 
unaccompanied,109 the Court will “not uphold an unconstitutional 
statute merely because the Government promised to use it 
responsibly.”110 The Court likely will strike down the Act for failing 
strict scrutiny. 
Nearly all of the analysis by the State and EMA revolved around 
standards of review, but the Court resurrected the issue of vagueness 
during oral arguments. The justices turned their attentions to how 
video game developers and distributors will struggle with interpreting 
the statute in order to comply with it.111 The language describing the 
types of games covered by the law (such as “deviant”) are not easy to 
define,112 and it is unclear how the legislature differentiated video 
games from other media to limit the Act from reaching violent 
material in other formats.113 Distinguishing different levels of violence, 
which is necessary as only certain “offensively violent” content would 
be subject to regulation, is even more problematic.114 Video game 
manufacturers would also struggle with defining their audience, 
particularly with regard to age subgroups of minors, each of which 
could be more or less susceptible to negative influences than the 
other.115 These issues merit the Court’s attention, despite the lower 
courts’ neglect of the vagueness issue.116 It is therefore possible that 
the constitutionality of the statute will be decided on due process 
grounds, rather than clarifying how violent subject matter, transmitted 
in new forms of media, will be regulated. It would not be the first time 
that the Court has offered a narrow ruling with limited applicability. 
If the Court does not invalidate the Act on vagueness grounds, a 
majority of the Court is likely to rely heavily on Stevens to find that 
violent video games are a form of speech protected by the First 
Amendment. Stevens demonstrates the Court’s unwillingness to 
 
 109. Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 78, at 3. 
 110. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591. 
 111. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 106, at 13. 
 112. Id. at 4. 
 113. Id. at 5. 
 114. Id. at 13–14. 
 115. Id. at 9–11. 
 116. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted sub nom. Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010). 
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create a carve-out for violent speech.117 The statute at issue was struck 
down by an 8-to-1 majority of the Roberts Court,118 and the justices in 
that majority probably will invalidate the Act here on similar grounds. 
The Roberts Court likely will not apply a softened standard of review 
to a content-based speech regulation119 of any medium. 
There is a “history in this country of new mediums coming along 
and people vastly overreacting to them, thinking the sky is falling, 
[and that] our children are all going to be turned into criminals.”120 
Today’s objection to video games’ conveyance of violent speech and 
effort to curtail minors’ access “springs largely from the neophobia 
that has pitted the old against the entertainment of the young for 
centuries.”121 As long as the Court is not diverted entirely by the 
vagueness question, Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association may settle the debate over depictions of violence that 
would otherwise arise repeatedly with the development of new media 
and vehicles of expression. 
 
 
 117. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
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25–26 (quoting Breeding Evil?, THE ECONOMIST, (Aug. 4, 2005), 
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